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Abstract: 
Numerous papers in the “law and finance” literature have established that countries with better 
functioning legal institutions enjoy better developed capital markets, and that legal origin is a 
fundamental determinant of legal institutions (La Porta et al. 1997, 1998, 2006; Djankov et al. 
2007). In this study, we test whether banks are willing to grant more credit to the private sector 
when they enjoy superior legal protection. We test this hypothesis using bank-level data from 45 
emerging-market countries and a random-effects model that controls for bank heterogeneity. We 
find that lenders allocate a significantly higher portion of their assets to loans (i) where they 
enjoy English legal origin rather than French or Socialist legal origin; (ii) where enforcement of 
debt contracts is more efficient and (iii) where banks enjoy fewer restrictions on their operations. 
These support our hypothesis that superior legal protection leads to more bank credit, which, in 
turn, should lead to higher economic growth. 
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1. Introduction 
 Recent research has established that legal origin and investor protection are important 
determinants of financial development.1 Countries with British common-law legal origin and 
better investor protection have better developed financial markets, which, in turn, lead to higher 
levels of economic growth (King and Levine, 1993). Much of this research has analyzed country-
level data, usually focusing on how investor protection affects the amount of private sector 
credit, which King and Levine (1993) and many others have linked to future economic growth. 
One question left largely unanswered by this literature is how lenders at the micro-level respond 
to differences in governance regimes. This question is especially important to emerging market 
economies, where bank debt is the primary source of business credit.   
 In this article, we extend the law and finance literature by using firm-level data from more 
than a thousand banks in 45 emerging-market countries to analyze how lenders respond to 
differences in legal origin and investor protection. Using a random-effects model that controls 
for bank heterogeneity, we find that lenders allocate a significantly higher portion of their assets 
to loans (i) where they enjoy English legal origin rather than French or Socialist legal origin; (ii) 
where enforcement of debt contracts is more efficient and (iii) where banks enjoy fewer 
restrictions on their operations. Where banks operate in countries with strong business and legal 
environments, they have incentive to extend more loans to the private sector. These findings 
generally support our hypothesis that superior legal protection leads to more bank credit, which, 
in turn, should lead to higher economic growth. 
 Our research builds on two strands of the literature: the “law and finance” literature and the 
“finance and growth” literature. The “law and finance” literature, which grew out of the seminal 
                                                          
1 See La Porta et al. 1997, 1998 and 2002; Levine 1999, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic 1998; 
Djankov et al. 2003 and 2007; and Qian and Strahan 2006. 
works of La Porta et al. (1997, 1998), has established that differences in legal protection of 
investors explain much of the variation in financial-sector development and that legal origin 
explains much of the variation in legal protection of investors. The “finance and growth” 
literature, which is most closely associated with King and Levine (1993), Levine and Zervos 
(1998) and Rajan and Zingales (1995, 1998), has established that financial sector development is 
positively related to economic growth. 
 We extend the literature by documenting one channel by which legal protection leads to 
better financial sector development. With better investor protection, bankers increase the portion 
of their asset portfolio allocated to loans. In aggregate, this should lead to higher levels of private 
sector credit, which the “finance and growth” literature has shown to be positively related to 
economic growth. Contrary to most previous research, we adopt a micro approach to examining 
the impact of the business and legal environments on banking operations, using bank-level data. 
 Consistent with the theoretical works of Aghion and Bolton (1992) and Hart and Moore 
(1992, 1994), we hypothesize that the risk-taking behavior of banks is affected by country’s legal 
tradition and the prevailing structures in terms of more openness in banking practices and better 
protection of property rights. Specifically, in countries with better legal protection, banks have an 
incentive to take on more portfolio risk because they face less risk of expropriation by borrowers.  
In other words, they can make more risky loans because their expected loss per loan is smaller 
when they enjoy the superior creditor protection available from the institutions in countries of 
British legal origin. 
 Our analysis rests on a panel data set of 1,075 commercial banks from 45 emerging 
economies over the period 1998-2004. Our sample covers nine different world regions: Latin 
America, Eastern, Northern, Southern and Central Europe, Middle East and North Africa 
(MENA), Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), and East Asia. Our interest has two justifications: 
first, there is wide variation in legal protection across countries in these regions; and second, 
banking in these parts of the world has received scant attention in the academic literature.  
 La Porta et al. (1998) argue that different legal origins, especially French civil law versus 
English common law, provide much different levels of investor protection that are reflected in 
financial sector development. Most of the countries included in the study were colonized by the 
world economic powers at the time until the middle of the past century and there is wide 
variation in creditor protection among them. This makes emerging economies an especially 
fertile laboratory for testing our hypothesis.  
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief review of the 
relevant literature. Section 3 presents the data and variables used in the study followed by 
multivariate analyses of the risk-return characteristics of commercial banks in section 4. Section 
5 provides a summary and conclusions. 
 
2. A brief review of the relevant literature 
 The “law and finance” literature essentially begins with La Porta et al. (1997, 1998), who 
argue and provide empirical evidence at the country level that the most important determinant of 
capital markets development is the degree of legal protection provided to investors. Corporate 
finance flourishes in countries with legal systems that better protect investors’ rights and support 
contract enforcement. In addition, they find that a country’s “legal origin” is a fundamental 
determinant of investor protection. “Legal origin” refers to the legal family from which a 
country’s legal system evolved.  
 In their 1998 article, La Porta et al. distinguish among two broad legal traditions: English 
common law and Roman civil law. Within the broad civil law tradition, they distinguish three 
families—French, German and Scandinavian. La Porta et al. find that countries with English 
common law tradition enjoy the best investor protection while countries with French civil law 
tradition suffer the worst investor protection.  They attribute these finding to differences in the 
legal protection from institutions left behind by the colonial powers. Also in this article, La Porta 
et al. develop an index of creditor rights, which they show is higher in common law countries 
than in civil law countries. 
 In a 1999 follow-up article, La Porta et al. expand the four families to five—with the 
addition of the Socialist civil law tradition, which enables them to better categorize eastern 
European countries that emerged following the breakup of the Soviet Union. They find that 
countries with Socialist civil law tradition suffer from poor legal protection similar to countries 
with French civil law tradition.  
 Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2003) analyze a sample of 70 countries for evidence 
regarding how well legal origins can explain financial development.  Among other findings, but 
most relevant to this study, they find that credit from financial intermediaries to the private sector 
as a share of GDP is higher in countries of British legal origin. 
 Djankov et al. (2003) construct two indices of procedural formalism in legal resolution of 
disputes—how many days it takes to collect a bounced check and how many days it takes to 
evict a tenant for nonpayment of rent. They find considerable variation in these measures and 
that procedural formalism is greater in civil-law countries than common law countries and in 
poorer countries than in rich countries. 
 Djankov et al. (2007) extend previous work on legal protection of creditors to a panel 
analysis of 129 countries over 25 years. They find that the creditors’ rights index developed by 
La Porta et al. (1998) is associated with higher levels of private sector credit, but that this 
relationship does not hold in poorer countries. They also find that procedural formalism is 
associated with lower levels of private sector credit but, again, this relationship does not hold in 
poorer countries.  
 Qian and Strahan (2007) examine data on individual bank loans for evidence on how 
differences in legal systems affect terms of bank loans. Like Djankov et al. (2007), they focus on 
the La Porta et al. (1998) index of creditor rights rather than legal origin, and find that stronger 
creditor rights are associated with lower interest rates and longer maturities. However, they also 
report that loans in countries of British legal origin carry higher rates and that higher rates are 
associated with greater financial development, which they attribute to higher loan demand for 
loans in more developed economies. 
The literature on “finance and economic growth” examines how economic growth is 
related to financial development. There now exists a wide empirical strand of the literature 
establishing a positive relationship between financial sector development and economic growth, 
although the direction of causality remains an issue of debate.  
Levine and Zervos (1998) document that stock-market liquidity and banking 
development are both positively and robustly correlated with future economic growth, capital 
accumulation and productivity growth.  
Rajan and Zingales (1998) examine the channels through which financial development 
promotes growth. They find that industrial sectors more dependent upon external finance 
develop disproportionately faster in countries with more developed financial markets. Hence, 
banks promote economic growth by reducing the cost of external finance of firms.  
Beck, Levine and Loayza (2000) find that financial development boosts economic growth 
primarily by improving resource allocation and accelerating total factor productivity growth.  
 This positive effect of financial development on growth is found to be robust to different 
econometric methods, from the cross-country regressions, cross-country instrumental variable 
studies and time-series analyses to the dynamic panel GMM estimations. Levine (2004) provides 
an excellent review on the research in this area. 
 Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998, 2002)  and Levine (1999) tie these two strands of 
the literature together. Kunt and Maksimovic (1998) use firm level data investigate how 
differences in legal systems affect use of external financing. They find that a greater portion of 
firms in countries with more efficient legal systems use external financing to fund growth. 
 Levine (1999) uses country-level data to examine how legal environment affect financial 
development and subsequent long-run economic growth. He finds that financial intermediaries 
are better developed in countries with better legal protection and that the portion of financial 
intermediary development explained by the legal environment is positively related to economic 
growth. 
 Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (2002) use firm-level data from 40 countries to analyze 
how a country’s legal and financial systems affect a firm’s ability to access external finance to 
fund growth opportunities. They find that the access to external finance is primarily a function of 
the efficiency of a country’s legal system. 
 
 
3. Data and Methodology 
         Our initial original sample includes 6,486 bank-year observations on banks located in 48 
emerging-market countries from nine world regions, including Latin America, East Asia, 
Eastern, Northern, Central and Southern Europe, MENA and GCC region. We apply a number of 
filtering rules to eliminate non-representative data, reducing our analysis sample to 5,648 
observations on 1,132 commercials banks2.  
 In terms of bank representation, Latin America dominates the sample and Northern Europe 
includes the least number of banks. Brazil, Panama and Argentina have the largest number of 
banks, followed by China, India, Lebanon and Poland, with Estonia, Qatar and Kuwait having 
the smallest number of banks. 
 We retrieve bank-level financial data for the years 1998-2004 from the BankScope 
database provided by Fitch-IBCA (International Bank Credit Analysis Ltd).  We collect 
information on total assets (TA), cash (CASH), total loans (LOANS), other earning assets 
(OEA), fixed assets (FxdAss), deposits (Dep), total equity (EQUITY), off-balance sheet (OffBS) 
along with net income from the banks’ income statements. We use these financial data to create 
standard prudential ratios of performance, capitalization and risk-taking, including return on 
assets (ROA), equity to assets (EQUITY/TA), and total loans to total assets (LOANS/TA).  
 We retrieve country-level “macro” data from the Heritage Foundation and from the 
International Financial Statistics. These include indices on banking activity restrictions, property 
rights, and GDP per capita.  
                                                          
2 Specifically, we deleted banks with loan-to-asset ratios of less than 15%, with fixed assets 
greater than 15% of total assets, with equity-to-asset ratios less than 1%, with off-balance sheet 
activities greater than five times total assets and with ROA greater than 0.4 or less than -0.2. 
 Finally, we collect information on legal origin, creditors’ rights, and procedural formalism 
from Professor Andrei Shleifer’s Harvard web pages.3  Legal origin is coded as a set of five 
dummy variables, one each for English, French, Germanic, Scandanavian and Socialist legal 
systems. In our sample, we have no Germanic or Scandanavian countries.  
 Creditors’ Rights measures the legal rights of creditors against defaulting borrowers in 
different countries. It is an index based upon the sum of four dummy variables that are coded as 
one if the answers to the following questions are yes and as zero if no: (1) Are there restrictions, 
such as creditor consent, for a debtor to file for reorganization? (2) Can secured creditors seize 
collateral after a reorganization petition is approved? (3) Are secured creditors paid first out of 
proceeds from liquidating a bankrupt firm? (4) Does management retain control of firm property 
pending resolution of the reorganization?  
 Legal Formalism is an estimate of the number of days that are necessary to collect on a 
bounced check before the courts in the country’ largest city. These estimates were prepared by 
law firms in each country surveyed by Djankov et al. (2003). An alternative measure is an 
estimate of the number of days necessary to collect an unpaid debt equal to 50% of the country’s 
GDP per capita, which is used by Djankov et al. (2007).  
 We then merge these country-level data with our bank-level data. We are unable to obtain 
governance data for three of our countries, forcing us to delete banks in those countries from our 
analysis. This leaves us with a sample of 5,543 bank-year observations on 1,075 banks in 45 
countries over the period 1998-2004. A description of the country-level governance and 
macroeconomic variables appears in Table 1. 
[Table 1 about here] 
                                                          
3 http://post.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/shleifer/data.html 
Appendix 1 presents the values of these governance variables by country and averaged by legal 
origin. 
 With these data, we first calculate univariate statistics and conduct some simple tests for 
differences in means of performance and condition, splitting our samples into groups with high 
and low levels of our governance indices. These tests provide some broad evidence on the 
importance of legal origin and creditor rights to the performance and risk-taking of banks. Next, 
we implement multivariate regression analyses to analyze these relationships more fully in a 
multivariate setting. Specifically, we analyze different versions of the following regression 
model: 
   Y i, t = β X j   +  δ C j   +  η Z j, t  +  ε i, t       (1) 
where:  
 Y i, t measures risk by the ratio of total loans to total assets, profitability by the ratio of net 
 income to total assets or net income to total equity, and capital adequacy by the ratio of 
 equity to total assets for bank i during year t; 
 X j is a set of dummy variables describing the legal origin of country j; 
 C j is a set of structural variables describing the country j, including governance indices that 
 measure investor protection; 
 Z j, t controls for the macroeconomic environment in terms of the level of economic 
 development; and 
 ε i, t is a random error term for bank i during year t. 
 
 Because we analyze panel data, we cannot rely upon ordinary-least-squares regression 
techniques as our error terms would be serially correlated. Typically, one must choose between a 
fixed-effects model and a random-effects model when analyzing panel data such as ours; 
however, we are constrained to using a random-effects model because our primary variables of 
interest—our indicators for Legal Origin—are invariant at both the bank and country levels. 
Therefore, they cannot be estimated using a fixed-effects model because they would be collinear 
with the fixed-effects dummy variables.  Consequently, we estimate all models using bank-level 
random effects. 
 
4. Empirical Findings 
 Our primary hypothesis is that banks in countries with English legal origin enjoy superior 
institutions that enable them to make more loans. The logic behind our hypotheses is that bankers 
are concerned about the total risk exposure of their loan portfolio. When they enjoy better legal 
protection reducing their risk of expropriation by borrowers, then they are able to take on 
increased portfolio risk by making more loans per dollar of assets. 
 We also test how profitability and bank capitalization are affected by differences in legal 
origin and legal protection. We have no prior expectations about either measure. Profitability 
should be higher if the banks increase portfolio risk beyond what they gain from reduced risk of 
expropriation attributable to superior legal protection, but should be lower if banks choose to 
reduce their overall level of risk. Capitalization as measured by the ratio of equity to asset should 
be higher if better legal protection comes in the form of more stringent banking supervision; 
alternatively, it should be lower if better legal protection reduces the need to hold capital as a 
reserve against expected losses. In other words, an alternative to increasing portfolio risk is to 
increase the risk of financial distress by increasing leverage.  
 Table 2 shows descriptive statistics on the credit risk exposure, capitalization level and 
profitability of banks by legal origin and other governance variables. 
[Table 2 about here] 
 Figures appearing in Panel A of Table 2 indicate little variation in the ratio of total loans to 
total assets by legal origin—0.502 for English, 0.497 for French and 0.498 for Socialist. In 
contrast, there are large differences in capitalization—0.095 for English, 0.142 for French and 
0.144 for Socialist. Differences in profitability are less pronounced—98 basis points for English, 
69 basis points for French and 90 basis points for Socialist. When we calculate test statistics for a 
t-test of significant differences in means, we find no significant differences in portfolio risk 
exposure, but significant differences in capitalization and profitability levels. Banks of English 
legal origin hold significantly less capital than banks of either French or Socialist origin. Banks 
of French legal origin are significantly less profitable than banks of English or Socialist origin.  
 Panel B of Table 2 examines differences by legal formalism. We split the sample at the 
median value of the days to recover a debt equal to half of the country’s GDP per capita. Hi 
Legal Formalism includes banks with greater than the median days of recovery, indicating less 
efficient legal enforcement. Here we see that banks in countries with less efficient legal systems 
allocate significantly less of their asset portfolio to loans (0.485 for Hi Legal Formalism versus 
0.511 for Low Legal Formalism), hold significantly more capital (14.1 percent versus 13.4 
percent of assets), and are significantly less profitable (71 basis points versus 87 basis points) . 
 Panel C of Table 2 examines differences by creditor protection as measured by the 
Creditors’ Rights index of La Porta et al. 1998. We split our sample at the median value of 2, 
putting into the Strong protection group only those banks located in countries with an index 
value greater than 2.0. Surprisingly, we find that banks in the Strong Protection group allocate 
significantly less of the asset portfolio to loans (47.0 percent versus 50.7 percent), but hold 
significantly less capital (13.1 percent versus 14.0 percent). Profitability is not significantly 
different. 
 Panel D of Table 2 examines differences by banking freedom as measured by the Heritage 
Foundation. Lower values of this index are associated with greater banking freedom. Again, we 
split our sample at the median value, here 3.0, with banks receiving lower values going into the 
Strong Freedom group while the remaining banks go into the Weak Freedom group.  We find 
that the Strong Freedom group holds significantly less capital but is significantly less profitable. 
We find no significant differences in portfolio risk. 
 Finally, Panel E of Table 2 examines differences by property rights as measured by the 
Heritage Foundation, where lower values are associated with stronger property rights. We 
classify banks in countries with less than the median value of 3.0 as Strong while the remaining 
banks we classify as Weak. Here, we find that banks in countries with Strong Rights allocate 
significantly more of their assets to loans (52.6 percent versus 48.8 percent), but are significantly 
less profitable (45 basis points versus 91 basis points ROA). 
 Overall, the statistics in Table 2 paint a murky picture of how portfolio risk, capitalization 
and profitability differ across governance regimes. 
 
Multivariate Regression Analysis: Loans to Assets 
 The results of the multivariate analyses of equation (1) appear in Tables 3-5.  
In Table 3 are the results where the dependent variable is our measure of credit risk exposure—
the ratio of total loans to total assets.  
[Table 3 about here] 
The coefficient on our control variable (log of GDP per capita) is also positive and highly 
significant. This underscores the importance of controlling for level of economic development 
when analyzing portfolio risk, and may explain the murky results found in our univariate 
analysis.  
 In Table 3, the effect of legal origin is measured relative to the omitted category, which is 
French legal origin. Hence, the coefficients on English and Socialist measure the difference in 
the loan-to-asset ratio of these groups from that of the excluded French group of banks. The 
explanatory variable English, is positive and its statistical significance improves when 
governance variables describing the banking environment are factored into the analysis. The 
coefficient of English ranges from 0.0383 to 0.0652, indicating that banks in countries of British 
legal origin allocate an additional 3.83 to 6.52 percent of their assets to their loan portfolios 
relative to the omitted French legal origin category. Given the average loan-to-asset ratio of 
slightly less than 0.50, this represents a seven- to thirteen-percent increase in the amount of 
credit that banks are injecting into the economy. In contrast, the Socialist legal origin dummy 
ranges from 0.0048 to 0.0151 but is not statistically significant in any specification. These results 
support our primary hypothesis: that better legal protection offered in countries of English legal 
origin enables banks in those countries to take on more portfolio risk without increasing their 
total risk (portfolio risk plus country-level legal risk).  
 In specification (2) of Table 3, we add the Djankov et al. 2007 measure of legal formalism 
(the natural logarithm of the number of days needed to recover a debt equal to half of country’s 
GDP per capita) to the explanatory variables in specification (1). Higher values indicate less 
efficient judicial enforcement of the country’s laws. The coefficient of Legal Formalism is 
negative and highly significant, indicating that banks in countries with greater legal formalism 
(less efficient enforcement) allocate significantly less of their assets to loans. The coefficient 
indicates that a one standard deviation increase in legal formalism would be associated with a 
loan to asset ratio that is lower by more than three percentage points. Also of interest is our 
finding that the effect of legal origin actually increases when we control for legal formalism, 
indicating that other mechanisms than judicial efficiency explain the differences by legal origin. 
 In specification (3), we add the La Porta et al. 1998 index of Creditors’ Rights to the 
variables appearing in specification (2). Higher values of this index indicate stronger protection 
of creditors’ rights. Contrary to our expectations, we find a negative and highly significant 
coefficient for Creditors’ Rights, indicating that banks located in countries with higher values of 
this index allocate significantly less of their assets to loans. The coefficient of Creditors’ Rights 
indicates that a one unit change in this index reduces the loan-to-asset ratio by 2.5 percentage 
points, or approximately five percent. In an attempt to better understand this result, we replace 
the index with dummy variables corresponding to each of the four components of the index. We 
find that only one of the four dummy variables is significant—the dummy indicating that a bank 
can seize its collateral after a borrower’s reorganization petition is approved (not shown in the 
table but available from the authors). 
 Finally, in specification (4), we add the two Heritage Foundation indices—Banking 
Freedom and Property Rights—to the variables appearing in specification (3). Only the 
coefficient on Banking Freedom is statistically significant. The negative coefficient on Banking 
Freedom indicates that banks located in countries with greater banking freedom allocate 
significantly more of their assets to loans than do banks in countries with less banking freedom, 
and that moving from the worst to best value of this indexes (2.5 to -2.5) would increase the loan 
to asset ratio by approximately 0.0167 x 5 = 0.0835 or 8.35 percentage points.  
 Multivariate Regression Analysis: Equity to Assets 
 Thus far, we have focused on the ratio of total loans to total assets, as much of the research 
on finance and growth has focused on how private sector credit leads to economic growth. 
However, better creditor protection could provide an incentive for banks to increase their 
financial risk rather than or in addition to their portfolio risk. Therefore, we also are interested in 
whether and, if so, how creditor protection affects bank capitalization.  In Table 4 are the results 
where our dependent variable is bank capitalization as measured by the ratio of Equity to Assets. 
[Table 4 about here] 
 As in Table 3, we sequentially enter our governance variables and French legal origin is the 
omitted category, so coefficients on English and Socialist measure the difference in the equity to 
asset ratio for banks in these countries relative to banks in French countries.  In specification (1), 
we enter the logarithm of GDP per capita along with our dummies for English and Socialist legal 
origin. The coefficient on our control for level of financial development is negative and 
significant, indicating that banks in countries with higher GDP per capita hold significantly less 
capital.  Also negative and significant is the coefficient on English, and its magnitude indicates 
that banks in English countries have capital ratios that are 7.05 percentage points lower than 
those in French countries, which is more than half of the 13.8 percent average capital ratio for 
our full sample. The coefficient on Socialist is not significantly different from zero, indicating no 
significant differences in the capitalization of banks in Socialist countries relative to banks in 
French countries.  In specification (2), we add our measure of Legal Formalism to the variables 
included in specification (1) and find that its coefficient is positive and highly significant, 
indicating that banks in countries with less efficient judicial systems hold significantly more 
capital. Our finding regarding legal origin is robust to including this governance measure.  In 
specification (3), we add our index of Creditors’ Rights to the variables included in specification 
(2). We find its coefficient to be positive and significant, indicating that banks in countries with 
better protection of creditors’ rights hold significantly less capital.  Finally, in specification (4), 
we add our two Heritage indices, for Banking Freedom and Property Rights. Neither of 
coefficients on these variables is statistically significant.  However, we find that our remaining 
results are robust to inclusion of these two variables. Overall, the results in Table 4 suggest that 
banks in countries of English legal origin are more highly levered than banks in countries of 
other legal origins, which is consistent with the substitution of solvency risk for expropriation 
risk, similar to what we observed in Table 3, where portfolio risk was substituted for 
expropriation risk.  
  
Multivariate Regression Analysis: Return on Assets 
 In Table 5 are the results where our dependent variable is bank profitability as measured by 
Return on Assets. The coefficients of both English and Socialist legal origin are positive, but not 
significantly different from zero. Hence, it appears that legal origin has no significant impact on 
bank profitability, which would be consistent with banks leaving their total risk exposure 
constant, substituting portfolio risk and financial risk for expropriation risk.  
[Table 5 about here] 
 Our measure of economic development is positive but only marginally significant until we 
add the index of Banking Freedom to the model. The coefficient on Banking Freedom is positive 
and statistically significant. This implies that banks in countries with more restrictions on 
banking activities achieve higher profitability. We interpret this result as showing that less 
banking freedom leads banks to require higher returns in order to compensate for bearing this 
cost. Also, tight governmental constraints on the banking sector constitute an entry barrier to the 
industry and discourage other financial institutions from entering the market. This could 
eventually lead to more concentration in banking and a higher degree of market power where 
incumbent banks are able to reap additional profits.  
 
5. Conclusions 
 In this article, we extend the law and finance literature by using firm level data from more 
than a thousand banks in 45 emerging-market countries to analyze how lenders respond to 
differences in legal origin and investor protection. Using a random-effects model that controls 
for bank heterogeneity, we find that lenders allocate a significantly higher portion of their assets 
to loans (i) where they enjoy English legal origin rather than French or Socialist legal origin; (ii) 
where enforcement of debt contracts is more efficient and (iii) where banks enjoy fewer 
restrictions on their operations. The results indicate that, when banks operate in countries with 
strong business and legal environments, they substitute portfolio risk and solvency risk for 
expropriation risk. These findings generally support our hypothesis that superior legal protection 
leads to more bank credit, which, in turn, should lead to higher economic growth.  We find no 
significant differences in profitability, suggesting that bankers substitute one type of risk for 
another (portfolio vs. solvency risk) rather than change the overall risk exposure of the bank. 
 These results provide new evidence on the importance of legal origin and investor 
protection to financial sector development and economic growth. Researchers in the “finance and 
growth” literature have established that better financial sector development as measured by 
aggregate domestic private credit lead to higher levels of economic growth. We extend the 
literature by documenting one channel by which legal protection leads to financial sector 
development. With better investor protection, bankers increase the portion of their assets 
allocated to loans. In aggregate, this should lead to higher levels of private sector credit, which 
the “finance and growth” literature has shown to be positively related to economic growth. 
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Table 1:  
Definitions of Country-Level Governance and Macroeconomic Variables 
 
Variable Name Description 
Banking and Finance 
Freedom 
An indicator of relative openness of banking & financial system. The index ranges in 
value from 1 (very high) to 5 (very low). It reflects 
• Government ownership of financial institutions 
• Restrictions on the ability of foreign banks to open branches and subsidiaries 
• Government influence over the allocation of credit 
• Government regulations 
Source: Heritage Foundation's Index of Economic Freedom  
Property Rights Freedom from government influence over the judicial system 
• Commercial code defining contracts 
• Sanctioning of foreign arbitration of contract disputes 
• Government expropriation of property 
• Corruption within the judiciary 
• Delays in receiving judicial decisions 
• Legally granted and protected private property 
A lower score indicates better protection of property rights in the country. 
Source: Heritage Foundation's Index of Economic Freedom 
Legal Origin  Identifies the legal origin of the company law or commercial code of each country 
(English, French, Socialist, German, Scandinavian). Source: Djankov et al. (2003). 
Legal Formalism 1 An estimate of the number of days that necessary to collect on a bounced check 
before the courts in the country’ largest city. These estimates were prepared by law 
firms in each country surveyed by Djankov et al. (2003).  
Source: Djankov et al. (2003) 
2 An alternative measure is an estimate of the number of days necessary to collect an 
unpaid debt equal to 50% of the country’s GDP per capita, which is used by Djankov 
et al. (2007). Source: Djankov et al. (2007)  
Higher values indicate greater procedural formalism and greater inefficiency in 
judicial enforcement. 
Creditors’ Rights An index ranging from zero to four based upon the sum of four dummy variables that 
are coded as one if the answers to the following questions are yes and as zero if no: 
(1) Are there restrictions, such as creditor consent, for a debtor to file for 
reorganization? (2) Can secured creditors seize collateral after a reorganization 
petition is approved? (3) Are secured creditors paid first out of proceeds from 
liquidating a bankrupt firm? (4) Does management retain control of firm property 
pending resolution of the reorganization? Higher scores indicate better protection of 
creditors’ rights. Source: Djankov et al. (2007) 
 
Per Capita GDP  Logarithm of per capita GDP. Source: International Financial Statistics 
 
  
 
Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics 
by Legal Origin, Legal Formalism, Creditor Rights, Banking Freedom and Property Rights 
Based upon an unbalanced panel of 1,075 banks in 45 emerging markets over the years 1998-2004. Loans/TA is the ratio of 
total loans to total assets; Equity/TA is the ratio of total equity to total assets; ROA is the ratio of net income to total assets. 
Means appear above standard errors. English, French and Socialist are dummy variables indicating English, French or Socialist 
legal origin as first defined by La Porta et al. 1998. Legal Formalism is the number of days needed to recover a debt equal to 
half of the country’s GDP per capita. Creditor Rights is the index of creditors rights first described in La Porta et al 1998. 
Banking Freedom is an index of banking freedom defined by the Heritage Foundation. Property Rights is an index of Property 
Rights defined by the Heritage Foundation. Table 1 provides more details on each variable. Hi versus Low refers to a split of 
the variable at the median value. 
         
 Observations  Loans/TA  Equity/TA  ROA  
         
All          5,543  0.498  0.138  0.0079  
   0.0024  0.0016  0.0005  
Panel A:         
English             528  0.502  0.095  0.0098  
   0.0065  0.0031  0.0010  
         
French          3,294  0.497  0.142  0.0069  
   0.0034  0.0021  0.0008  
         
Socialist          1,721  0.498  0.144  0.009  
   0.0038  0.0030  0.0006  
Panel B:         
Hi Legal Formalism2 2,797  0.485  0.141  0.0071  
   0.0034  0.0022  0.0008  
         
Low Legal Formalism2 2,851  0.511  0.134  0.0087  
   0.0033  0.0023  0.0006  
Panel C:         
Strong Creditor Rights 1,409  0.470  0.131  0.0080  
   0.0054  0.0033  0.0010  
         
Weak Creditor Rights 4,239  0.507  0.140  0.0079  
   0.0026  0.0018  0.0006  
Panel D:         
Strong Banking Freedom 1,817  0.493  0.132  0.0031  
   0.0045  0.0027  0.0012  
         
Weak Banking Freedom 3,831  0.500  0.140  0.0102  
   0.0028  0.0019  0.0005  
Panel E:         
Strong Property Rights 1,482  0.526  0.138  0.0045  
   0.0047  0.0032  0.0011  
         
Weak Property Rights 4,166  0.488  0.138  0.0091  
   0.0027  0.0018  0.0006  
         
 
Table 3 
Random-Effects Regressions to Explain the Ratio of Total Loans to Total Assets 
Based upon an unbalanced panel of 1,075 banks in 45 emerging markets over the years 1998-2004 for a total of 5,543 
observations. ln(GDP per capita) is the natural logarithm of the country’s per capita Gross Domestic Product in each year. English, 
French and Socialist are dummy variables indicating English, French or Socialist legal origin as first defined by La Porta et al. 
1998. French is the omitted category. Legal Formalism is the natural logarithm of the number of days needed to recover a debt 
equal to half of the country’s GDP per capita, as defined by Djankov et al. (2007). Creditor Rights is the index of creditors rights 
first described in La Porta et al. 1998. Banking Freedom is an index of banking freedom defined by the Heritage Foundation. 
Property Rights is an index of Property Rights defined by the Heritage Foundation. Table 1 provides more details on each variable. 
Coefficients appear above robust standard errors. a, b and c indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, 
respectively. 
          
          
          
Intercept  0.0462  0.401 a 0.417 a 0.524 a 
  0.0451  0.064  0.063  0.0671  
          
ln(GDP per capita)  0.0566 a 0.0613 a 0.0628 a 0.0564 a 
  0.0057  0.0058  0.0058  0.0581  
          
English  0.0383 b 0.0444 a 0.0526 a 0.0652 a 
  0.0164  0.0166  0.0166  0.0167  
          
Socialist  0.0108  0.0048  0.0137  0.0151  
  0.0110  0.0109  0.0112  0.0113  
          
Legal Formalism    -0.0648 a -0.0621 a -0.0612 a 
    0.0102  0.0100  0.0101  
          
Creditors' Rights      -0.0248 a -0.0246 a 
      0.0053  0.0054  
          
Banking Freedom        -0.0167 a 
        0.0041  
          
Property Rights        -0.0052  
        0.0043  
          
 
 
 
Table 4 
Random-Effects Regressions to Explain the Ratio of Total Equity to Total Assets 
Based upon an unbalanced panel of 1,075 banks in 45 emerging markets over the years 1998-2004 for a total of 5,543 observations. 
ln(GDP per capita) is the natural logarithm of the country’s per capita Gross Domestic Product in each year. English, French and 
Socialist are dummy variables indicating English, French or Socialist legal origin as first defined by La Porta et al. 1998. French is the 
omitted category. Legal Formalism is the natural logarithm of the number of days needed to recover a debt equal to half of the 
country’s GDP per capita, as defined by Djankov et al. (2007). Creditor Rights is the index of creditors rights first described in La 
Porta et al. 1998. Banking Freedom is an index of banking freedom defined by the Heritage Foundation. Property Rights is an index 
of Property Rights defined by the Heritage Foundation. Table 1 provides more details on each variable. Coefficients appear above 
robust standard errors. a, b and c indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
 
          
          
          
Intercept  0.314 a 0.212 a 0.216 a 0.219 a 
  0.029  0.042  0.041  0.043    
          
Ln(GDP per capita)  -0.0205 a -0.0217 a -0.0212 a -0.0209 a 
  0.0037  0.0038  0.0038  0.0039  
          
English  -0.0705 a -0.0721 a -0.0698 a -0.0700 a 
  0.0108  0.0107  0.0108  0.0109  
          
Socialist  -0.0016  0.0001  0.0026  0.0021   
  0.0083  0.0082  0.0081  0.0081  
          
Legal Formalism    0.0183 a 0.0190 a 0.0185 a 
    0.0064  0.0064  0.0064  
          
Creditors' Rights      -0.0069 b -0.0068 b 
      0.0033  0.0033    
          
Banking Freedom        0.0003   
        0.0026  
          
Property Rights        -0.0011   
        0.0026  
          
 
 
 
 
Table 5 
Random-Effects Regressions to Explain the Ratio of Return on Assets (ROA) 
Based upon an unbalanced panel of 1,075 banks in 45 emerging markets over the years 1998-2004 for a total of 5,543 
observations. ln(GDP per capita) is the natural logarithm of the country’s per capita Gross Domestic Product in each year. 
English, French and Socialist are dummy variables indicating English, French or Socialist legal origin as first defined by La 
Porta et al. 1998. French is the omitted category. Legal Formalism is the natural logarithm of the number of days needed to 
recover a debt equal to half of the country’s GDP per capita, as defined by Djankov et al. (2007). Creditor Rights is the 
index of creditors rights first described in La Porta et al. 1998. Banking Freedom is an index of banking freedom defined by 
the Heritage Foundation. Property Rights is an index of Property Rights defined by the Heritage Foundation. Table 1 
provides more details on each variable. Coefficients appear above robust standard errors. 
a, b and c indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
          
          
          
Intercept  0.0039   0.0033   0.0033   -0.0158 c 
  0.0070  0.0072  0.0071  0.0089  
          
ln(GDP per capita)  0.0014   0.0016 c 0.0016 c 0.0029 a 
  0.0008  0.0009  0.0009  0.0010  
          
English  0.0033   0.0036 c 0.0034 c 0.0006  
  0.0019  0.0019  0.0019  0.0019  
          
Socialist  0.0022  0.0021  0.0020  0.0015  
  0.0014  0.0014  0.0014  0.0014  
          
Legal Formalism    -0.0015   -0.0015   -0.0019 c 
    0.0010  0.0010  0.00100  
          
Creditors' Rights      0.0003   0.0004  
      0.0006  0.0006  
          
Banking Freedom        0.0035 a 
        0.0010  
          
Property Rights        0.0003  
        0.0009  
          
 
 
Appendix 1 
Country-level governance, macro-economic and average bank-level data for a panel of 1,075 banks in 45 emerging-market countries 
Variables are defined in Table 1. Countries are grouped by legal origin (English, Socialist or French). 
 
           
 
           
          
 
           
          
          
         
   
          
  
           
          
           
      
          
           
           
          
           
           
           
           
           
         
Country Obs. 
Creditors’ 
Rights 
Legal 
Formalism1
Legal 
Formalism2
Banking 
Freedom 
Property 
Rights 
GDP 
per 
capita 
Loans 
to 
Assets 
Equity 
to 
Assets ROA 
 
English 
 India 276 2 106 425 4.00 3.00 0.508 0.444 0.060 0.008
Saudi Arabia
 
56 3 428 360 3.57 2.57 8.330 0.414 0.102 0.017
Thailand
 
87 2 210 390 3.00 2.17 2.125 0.624 0.100 -0.004
UAE 109
 
2 559 614 3.71 4.00 19.644 0.598 0.177 0.021
     Average 2.25
 
326 447 3.57
 
2.94
 
7.652
 
0.520
 
0.110
 
0.010
  
Socialist 
Bosnia 88 3 330 330 3.52 5.00 1.677 0.502 0.238 0.007
Bulgaria
 
142 2 410 440 2.84 3.16 2.124 0.466 0.185 0.010
China 286 2 180 241 3.64 4.00 1.089 0.516 0.097 0.000
Croatia 174 3 330 415 2.87 4.00 5.220 0.516 0.172 0.008
Czech Republic 
 
123 3 270 300 1.00 2.00 7.653 0.401 0.092 0.006
Hungary 129 1 365 365 2.00 2.00 6.265 0.533 0.113 0.011
Latvia 75 3 189 189 2.00 3.00 4.112 0.434 0.130 0.010
Macedonia
 
43 3 330 509 2.00 4.00 2.054 0.407 0.252 0.021
Poland 214 1 1000 1000 3.00 2.00 5.174 0.520 0.130 0.007
Slovakia 81 2 1003 565 2.33 3.00 5.075 0.426 0.088 0.005
Slovenia 83 3 1003 1003 2.72 2.45 12.158 0.526 0.099 0.011
Belarus 72 2 287 250 3.93 4.00 1.249 0.507 0.219 0.021
Moldova 40 2 287 280 3.00 3.65 0.417 0.498 0.233 0.042
Ukraine 171
 
2 224 269 3.18 1.51 0.844 0.560 0.161 0.014
     Average 2.29 443 440 2.72 3.13 3.936 0.487 0.158 0.012
 
 
 
 
Appendix 1 (cont.) 
           
   
 
         
   
           
           
          
           
           
           
           
          
          
           
           
          
           
           
           
           
           
          
           
           
          
           
          
          
           
           
         
Country Obs. 
Creditors’ 
Rights 
 
Legal 
Formalism1
Legal 
Formalism2
Banking 
Freedom 
 
Property 
Rights 
 
GDP per 
capita 
 
Loans 
to 
Assets 
 
Equity 
to 
Assets
 
ROA
    
French  
 Albania 28 3 330 390 3.36 4.00 1.692 0.349 0.161 0.009
Algeria 32 1 134 407 3.38 3.72 1.902 0.442 0.112 0.006
Argentina
 
309 1 300 520 2.56 2.87 5.356 0.416 0.183 -0.019
Bolivia 69 2 464 591 2.00 3.28 0.949 0.650 0.139 -0.001
Brazil 474 1 180 566 3.00 3.00 3.102 0.458 0.173 0.019
Chile 126 2 200 305 2.55 1.00 4.897 0.597 0.197 0.009
Columbia 116 0 527 363 2.00 3.49 1.965 0.580 0.122 0.003
Costa Rica
 
97 1 370 550 3.00 3.00 3.937 0.620 0.147 0.016
Ecuador
 
84 0 333 388 3.38 3.85 1.901 0.523 0.127 0.016
Egypt 145 2 202 410 3.45 3.00 1.198 0.489 0.096 0.011
Honduras 96 2 225 545 3.00 3.31 0.937 0.562 0.113 0.010
Indonesia
 
197 2 225 570 3.91 3.65 0.867 0.461 0.133 0.015
Jordan 64 1 147 342 2.00 2.42 1.771 0.420 0.096 0.008
Kuwait 37 3 357 390 3.00 1.62 16.038 0.434 0.114 0.016
Lebanon 238 4 721 721 2.00 3.32 4.769 0.301 0.089 0.007
Lithuania 44 2 150 154 2.48 3.00 4.387 0.530 0.134 0.004
Morocco 50 1 192 240 2.58 4.00 1.323 0.517 0.094 0.010
Nicaragua
 
42 4 319 155 3.43 2.71 0.762 0.460 0.077 0.017
Oman 43 0 428 455 1.12 3.35 7.561 0.721 0.186 0.014
Panama 315 4 197 355 2.70 4.00 4.073 0.534 0.122 0.012
Paraguay
 
96 1 222 285 2.00 3.23 1.199 0.497 0.156 0.010
Peru 99 0 441 441 3.00 2.69 2.142 0.585 0.128 0.003
Philippines
 
56 1 164 380 2.45 2.14 0.963 0.559 0.189 0.007
Romania
 
130 1 225 335 3.32 4.00 2.081 0.445 0.193 0.002
Tunisia 94 0 7 27 2.87 3.00 2.234 0.686 0.120 0.008
Turkey 107 2 105 330 2.69 2.52 2.578 0.391 0.129 0.001
Uruguay 107
 
3 360 620 2.19 2.00 4.412 0.719 0.150 -0.019
     Average 1.63 279 401 2.72 3.04 3.148 0.517 0.136 0.007
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